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Inflation Targeting as a Stabilisation Tool: Its Design and
Performance in the Czech Republic
This year marks not only ten years of independent monetary policy of the Czech National
Bank (CNB), but also five years of the Inflation Targeting (IT) framework in the Czech
Republic. This is a good opportunity to look back and analyse how the regime has evolved
and what overall results it has brought. Accordingly, the goal of this paper is twofold. First,
we discuss why the policy framework evolved the way it did in different time periods.
Second, we ask if the evolution of the policy framework is mirrored in the performance of
monetary policy, we discuss how the performance could be evaluated and offer some results.
The paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines the evolution of the
regime design. After briefly reviewing the starting conditions, we ask why the inflation
targets were defined in the specific way and why the given target horizon was chosen. We
then shortly describe the challenges of targeting inflation in a small open economy and show
what tools may be available to efficiently manage them. The second chapter analyses whether
the regime changes translated into the performance of Czech monetary policy in the past
years. We first concentrate on different approaches that are available to evaluate the
performance of monetary policy. Following this discussion we consequently offer three
different ways of evaluating the performance of the IT period of the CNB. In the last chapter
we briefly summarise our findings and offer a glimpse into the future of IT in the Czech
Republic.
1  The Evolution of the Regime Design
In this Chapter we discuss the key issues that have determined the design of the IT regime
in the last few years in the Czech Republic. The issues are discussed in chronological order as
they arose in practice. We first briefly review the developments that led to adopting the IT
framework. We then proceed to discuss the definition of the targets in terms of their horizon.
The next part of this chapter focuses on the possibilities of dealing with supply shocks in
small open transition economies and analyses what part of the CPI basket the inflation targets
should cover. The last two parts of this chapter discuss the definition of price stability and a
recent move of the CNB’s IT strategy towards a “full-fledged” IT regime.
The introduction of Inflation Targeting in the Czech Republic may be seen as a reaction to
economic turmoil of 1997. In that year, the fixed exchange rate regime of the Czech koruna
was abandoned after more than seven years due to a speculative attack. The reasons for this
had been accumulating for several years. After the Czech koruna was made fully convertible
in October 1995, a positive interest rate differential and a fixed exchange rate attracted high
capital inflow. The capital inflow not only pushed the mixed fixed exchange rate and
monetary targeting strategy of the central bank deeper into a vicious “sterilisation trap” but –
combined with generous wage policies and later fiscal overspending – it soon manifested
itself in roaring excess demand. The excess demand seeped primarily through growing current
account deficits as many durables were not produced internally and inflation was kept low by
the fixed exchange rate. The fragility of the Czech balance of payments was made very visible
to foreign market participants during the 1997 Asian crisis and a speculative attack on the
koruna was launched in the spring of that year. The CNB was not able to counteract the attack3
using standard tools and the authorities were forced to let the koruna float at the end of May
1997. Needless to say, the exchange rate turmoil was highly destabilising for the economy.
The increase in tradables prices following the 10% depreciation of the koruna, combined with
unfortunately timed freeing of regulated prices, the so-called “deregulation” (see Figure 1),
led to a doubling of CPI inflation rate between mid-1997 and the beginning of 1998,
notwithstanding the quickly opening negative output gap. This development of inflation and
the absence of a nominal anchor in the economy understandably drove up inflation
expectations. The low efficiency and credibility of the monetary targeting strategy, persistent
and high inflation expectations and the experience of countries directly targeting inflation led
the CNB to establish Inflation Targeting as a framework for monetary policy in January
1998.
2
How to define the targets?
Although the short-term objective of introducing IT was to stabilise inflation after the
1997 turmoil, the main goal in the medium to long-term was to stabilise prices, i.e. decrease
inflation. The disinflation process was clearly defined by a medium-term target that the CNB
announced together with the introduction of the regime in December 1997. The choice of IT
as a disinflation strategy was relatively new at the time, since most countries that had
introduced IT before had done so only after inflation was under control or on a downward
path. Little international experience and structural changes in the economy made it difficult to
back the decision on the speed of disinflation by rigorous calculations on properties such as
sacrifice ratio and the like. After some analyses, the CNB committed itself to setting its
monetary policy instruments so as to achieve annual net inflation of 4.5 percent with an
interval of +/- 1 p.p. by the end of 2000. Since inflation was at around 10 % in the end of
1997, arithmetically this meant decreasing inflation by about 2 percentage points a year.
However, since the spike in inflation at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 was
perceived as a temporary phenomenon, the actual disinflation was not to be so steep. This was
reflected in the short-term target that the CNB announced at the same time as the medium-
term target: net inflation of 6 percent with a narrower interval (reflecting smaller uncertainty)
of +/- 0.5 p.p. for the end of 1998. In November 1998, another short-term net inflation target
of 4.5 percent with a +/- 0.5 p.p. interval was set for the end of 1999 (see Table 1).
The initial design of the regime had three distinct and later abandoned features:
(i) short-term targets that were defined for (ii) year-to-year inflation in December in terms of
(iii) net inflation. Let us now briefly discuss the rationale behind the first two features; net
inflation will be discussed in the next section.
3 First, the idea of short-term targets was often
debated not only by outside observers (see e.g. Čihák and Holub, 1998) but also internally.
Specifically, this debate concerned the targets for 1998 and 1999 that were announced only
12, respectively 13 months ahead. Opponents to this approach said that since the targeted
horizon roughly matched the estimated monetary policy transmission lag (12-18 months),
these targets were more forecasts of inflation than an actual guide to setting the  central
bank’s interest rate. On the other hand, the short-term targets reflected the credibility concerns
of the period. The one year-ahead time horizon corresponded with the average duration of
nominal contracts, which could be useful while attempting to anchor inflation expectations
especially in wage negotiations. The second distinct feature was that the targets were set in
terms of year-to-year inflation for December. This would perhaps not be discussed in
economies with stable inflation rates. In the Czech case some argued that monetary policy
would concentrate too much on the December figure and could even employ one-off
                                                
2 See Dědek (2000) for an analysis of the 1997 exchange rate turmoil and Hnčíř and Šmídková (1999) for a
discussion of the reasons for introducing IT.
3 See Schaechter et al. (2000) for an international comparison of targeted horizons and indices.4
foreign-exchange interventions to ensure fulfilling the target through the direct exchange rate
channel. This was never the case but it is true that the year-end specification of the targets
made them perhaps more difficult to communicate to an expert audience than if average
inflation rates for a given year were chosen. This is especially so since the targets were
designed to roughly mark the disinflation path without aiming at reaching exact numbers in
exact months of the year – a notion that the year-end targets certainly provoked.
Net inflation and regulated prices
The third distinct feature of the initial framework was that only a part of the CPI basket
was targeted in the first period since 1998. As the reason behind this feature is an important
phenomenon of pursuing IT in a small open economy, let us briefly describe the problem on a
more general level. This debate arises in connection to communication difficulties that
monetary policy-makers have in responding to supply shocks. On the one hand, since strict
reaction of IT central bank to a supply shock could trigger undesired fluctuations of output,
one would like to abstract from the primary effects of supply shocks in the decision making
process. On the other hand, not responding to supply shocks may lead to missing the target.
Given the cause, this would be acceptable by experts in the field but may actually negatively
affect the bank’s credibility among the general public. This communication difficulty often
leads central banks to either exclude some items (connected to supply shocks) from the
targeted index or introduce the so-called “caveats” or “escape clauses” to fulfilling the target
or both. Neither solution is, however, without problems. First, unless the central bank is
successful in making everyone in the economy link the word “inflation” to the narrower
index, it is almost impossible to influence expectations by something just a few economists
can disentangle. This might be why only one quarter of IT central banks do actually target a
different price measure than the headline inflation (Schmidt-Hebel and Tapia, 2002). As for
the escape clauses, apart from some difficult conceptual issues (such as an ex ante versus ex
post approach to interpreting them), they could be understood by the public as cheating on the
part of the central bank’s commitment. In other words, the more exceptions one defines from
a commitment, the less binding the commitment seems and the lower credibility it is likely to
have. Decreasing credibility of the inflation target again means less impact on expectations, a
cornerstone of IT. In the case of small open economies in transition, monetary policy is likely
to face many supply shocks, which then makes this communication issue quite relevant. In the
Czech case, the CNB went through an evolutionary process. At first only a narrower index
was targeted - specifically until 2001 the CNB had targeted the so-called net inflation that
excluded 18 percent of the CPI basket items that were regulated by the government (e.g.,
energy prices and rents).
4 Later, as will be described below, escape clauses were added and
even later the narrower index was abandoned for a headline inflation index and two more
escape clauses were added.
Before moving on to examine the consequent changes of the IT regime design, let us
briefly mention the relationship between net inflation and the remaining part of the CPI basket
– regulated prices. Examining Figure 1, one can clearly see the positive correlation between
net inflation and the inflation of regulated prices. The reasons might be threefold.  First, the
net inflation measure includes indirect effects of deregulations. These are, however, not
strong enough to lead to the observed correlation. Second, some regulated prices are steered
according to market conditions – sometimes only an upper limit is given or prices are adjusted
to allow monopolies to realise a rather disputable “adequate profit”. This way of regulating
prices has been applied, however, to a larger extent only since cross-financing of energy
                                                
4 For analytical purposes even a narrower measure of “core inflation”, defined as net inflation minus the
influence of food prices, has been used.  This index accounts for only 54 percent of the CPI basket, which would
mean even smaller chances to influence inflation expectations should it be chosen as the targeted index.5
consumption between enterprises and households was abolished in 2001.
5 Third, the
correlation might be unfortunate but rather accidental: deregulation steps were motivated by
political factors that happened to lead to the observed correlation. Whatever the reason, it is
clear that the deregulation policy of the government was unfortunate in that it contributed to
higher inflation volatility throughout most of the IT period.




















































































































inflation of regulated prices
The definition of price stability and “escape clauses”
The first adjustment, or one could say “prolongation”, of the regime design was undertaken in
April 1999 when The CNB Monetary Strategy (see CNB, 1999) document defined what the
CNB understands by price stability and when it should be achieved. The document did not
attempt to change the goal of the central bank, which was according to constitution law
“monetary stability” (the term was replaced by “price stability” only in May 2002). Its aim
was to define “price stability” quantitatively, which also meant prolonging the disinflation
path into the future.
6 The CNB announced that price stability is to be understood as net
inflation of 2 % with a  1 p.p. interval around it and is to be met by the end of 2005.
According to CNB (1999a), the idea behind this number reflected (i) that low inflation is one
of the key conditions for sustainable growth, and at the same time that it is highly valued by
society; (ii) the specific conditions of a small and very open economy tightly inter-linked with
the EU; (iii) the rate of progress towards price and monetary stability and necessary structural
adaptations, particularly the adjustment of relative prices and the catching-up process; and
(iv) consistency with the strategy for the integration into European institutions and EMU
accession.
Following the discussion in the preceding section, the document also contained additional
factors that the CNB would regard as not encompassed by the target commitment and hence
not requiring a policy response. These are referred to as “caveats” or “escape clauses” to the
                                                
5 Functioning in the opposite direction is a possible negative income effect: deregulations mean a rise in the
prices of goods or services that are difficult to substitute (so-called necessities) and this implies, ceteris paribus,
a smaller income to be spent on other goods and prices. Smaller demand for these goods could trigger a fall in
some of these prices, inducing a slow-down in net inflation. It is, however, impossible to disentangle this effect
from the crude figure below.
6 See Kotlán (2001) for a discussion on whether it should be the central bank, the government or the Parliament
who quantitatively defines price stability and the speed of disinflation.6
commitment to a specific numerical target.
7 The CNB specified these to be: major deviations
of world prices of raw materials, energy-producing materials and other commodities from the
forecast; major deviations of the koruna's exchange rate that are not connected with domestic
economic fundamentals and domestic monetary policy; major changes in the conditions for
agricultural production having an impact on agricultural producer prices; natural disasters and
other extraordinary events having cost and demand impacts on prices.
Together with refining the design of the regime by definition of price stability and escape
clauses, the document also anchored the way the CNB planned to set targets in the future.
Namely, it was established that from then on the targets would be set 20 months ahead. This
horizon reflected two concerns. First, April is a month when preparations of next year’s fiscal
budget start and by acting first, monetary policy can provide an anchor to the deliberations of
the fiscal authority. Second and perhaps more importantly, the decision on the horizon
reflected the transmission lags in monetary policy pursuit. This was a step in the direction of
really targeting inflation rather than forecasting future inflation.
8 Following the “20 months
ahead practice”, a year later, in April 2000, a target was set for the end of 2001 at 3 percent
with a +/- 1 p.p. interval around it.
Moving closer towards a “full-fledged” IT
Notwithstanding these refinements of the framework, the end-of-year targets and net
inflation still remained prominent features of the regime. It was only at the beginning of 2001
that a decision was made to move further towards a “full-fledged” form of IT regime that is
based more on a medium-term perspective (see CNB, 2001). The CNB abandoned both the
net inflation index and the practice of year-end targets. The move from targeting net inflation
to targeting headline inflation was motivated by three factors. First, the net inflation index
was never fully understood by the general public. For instance, in wage negotiations the
labour unions would rather refer to last year’s headline inflation than to the target for net
inflation for the year concerned. Second, as discussed above, many of the “regulated” prices
had gradually started to be set in a manner that reflected the evolution of the rest of the CPI
basket. Third, the central bank’s improving communication with the government and
demands from the EU resulted in a plan of gradual deregulation of the  remaining
administrative price controls. Based on this outlook, the CNB conditioned the headline
inflation target on the assumption that the contribution of the regulated prices would be within
the 1 to 1.5 p.p. range per annum.
Apart from abandoning the net inflation index, the new regime design also abandoned the
practice of year-end targets. The new target is specified in terms of a continuous and smoothly
declining target band. The band was announced starting in January 2002 at 3-5 percent and
ending in December 2005 at 2-4 percent.
9 The declining “corridor”, as it is sometimes
referred to, reflects the idea that spontaneous adjustments of relative price distortions will be
eliminated with decreasing speed. The target was officially declared together with the
government, which brought some commitment on the part of the government to respect the
target in its medium-term policy decisions and it also increased the  credibility of the target.
The escape clauses defined previously were amended by two new ones (contribution of
                                                
7 In fact the CNB had already made these public a few months before that, while announcing the short-term
inflation target for 1999 in November 1998.
8 This is not to say that forecasts should not be performed while setting the targets. In fact, they are important
especially in disinflation since they help to evaluate the desired speed of disinflation (see Mahadeva and
Šmídková, 2000).
9 Note that the 2-4 percent in December 2005 in headline inflation is consistent with the notion of “price
stability” defined in 1999 as 1-3 percent in net inflation and the assumed contribution of 1-1.5 percentage points
of regulated prices to the headline CPI.7
regulated prices in the above-mentioned range and abstraction from changes in indirect taxes)
and they jointly continue to affect the CNB’s interpretation of whether the targets will be
respected in their unaltered form or subject to defined exceptions. Tables 1 and 2 summarise
the target specification together with the time when they were set.
The last change (as of mid-2003) in the regime design was undertaken in July 2002 when
the bank decided to switch to a different type of forecasting methodology. In connection with
consolidating its internal Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (see Coats et al., 2003), the
CNB chose to move from a constant interest rate forecast to a forecast which includes an
endogenous monetary policy reaction.
10 This move is to reflect the stabilising role that
monetary policy has on future economic fluctuations. In its communication, the CNB verbally
expresses what interest rate path is consistent with the current outlook. The forecast of interest
rates, however, does not represent any commitment on the part of the central bank as to future
interest rates. First, the forecast is based on current information and any future change in the
information set will result in a different forecast and a different interest rate path consistent
with it. Second, the interest rate trajectory is only a crude expression of the active monetary
policy and does not take into account all the fine policy discussions that in the end shape
actual policy decisions.
Table 1: The CNB’s inflation targets set in terms of net inflation
Year Target (interval around
it)
Target month Set in
1998 6.0 % (+/- 0.5 p.p.) December 1998 December 1997
1999 4.5 % (+/- 0.5 p.p.) December 1999 November 1998
2000 4.5 % (+/- 1.0 p.p.) December 2000 December 1997
2001 3.0 % (+/- 1.0 p.p.) December 2001 April 2000
2005 2.0 % (+/- 1.0 p.p.) December 2005 April 1999
Table 2: The CNB’s inflation targets set in terms of headline inflation
Target range (percent) Target month Set in
Range starts 3 – 5 January 2002
Range ends 2 – 4 December 2005
April 2001
                                                
10 See Inflation Report -  July 2002 for a more detailed explanation of the change and Skořepa and Kotlán (2003)
for a discussion of the issue of constant interest rate forecasts (so-called conditional forecasts) versus forecasts
with active monetary policy (so-called unconditional).8
2  The Performance of Czech Monetary Policy under IT
Since there is no use in having a regime with “best-practice” design that does not perform
well, this chapter concentrates on the performance of Czech monetary policy. Evaluating the
performance of monetary policy is a challenging task to which there is no single ideal
approach. In this chapter we present three ways of going about this issue. One approach is to
examine whether the specific goals in the given strategies have been met: have the money
growth targets been met, have the inflation targets been met or has the exchange rate
remained pegged within a given corridor? This approach has some caveats. On the one hand,
if monetary policy pre-emptively responds to current or expected shocks, these shocks are
later not observable from the data. On the other hand, there may be events that monetary
policy is not able or not willing to counteract efficiently, such as supply shocks, but which
significantly affect the goal variable. This all means that it is difficult to say ex post whether
monetary policy responded well to shocks that would have pushed the economy out of
equilibrium. However, since comparing inflation with the given inflation targets may seem as
the most straightforward way to evaluate the performance of IT, we will attempt this approach
in the first part of this chapter.
Another approach to evaluate monetary policy is to look at how stabilising it has been for
the decision-making of economic agents. This view reflects the premise that the role of
economic policy is to stabilise the economic environment in which private agents may then
take more efficient decisions. There are several international studies that take this route.
Kuttner and Posen (1999) argue that the move towards IT by the Bank of Canada and the
Bank of England in early 1990s presented a shift from discretionary to trusted and close-to-
optimal state contingent rules (OSCR) for the economy. Laxton and N’Diaye (2002) argue
that IT improves credibility of monetary policy. We examine the stabilising role of monetary
policy on the decision-making process of agents in two ways. First, we analyse the variability
of one-year-ahead inflation expectations compared to the actual inflation development and
then the congruency of long-term inflation expectations with the long-term target of monetary
policy. Second, as a measure of policy transparency, we examine to what extent the decisions
taken by the CNB have been anticipated.
Last but not least, one can examine to what extent the given monetary policy contributed
to the final objectives of monetary policy - price stability, and in some cases output stability.
This is the approach taken by most studies aiming to evaluate the performance of IT. Several
of them, notably the work of Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), Nadal-De Simon (2001) and
Neumann and von Hagen (2002) argue that the Inflation Targeting framework reduces the
variability of inflation without negative effects on the variability of growth. Truman (2003) is
a bit more cautious and argues that IT reduces both inflation and its variability with no
negative effect on output growth rates except that there is a negative effect on the output
variability. Contrary to these studies, Ball and Sheridan (2003) are more sceptical about the
possible beneficial effects of IT on inflation or its variability in the long run. The impact of IT
on the variability of both output and inflation is the route we take in the last part of this
chapter under the so-called loss function approach.
Inflation and inflation targets
This approach to examining the performance of monetary policy under IT is based on
comparing inflation and the corresponding inflation target. Even though it may seem to be a
trivial exercise at first, it is not completely the case. In fact there are several reasons in
Inflation Targeting, a regime based on forecasts, for why the targets may not be fulfilled.
First, the most obvious one: policy was wrong. This means that given a correct forecast, the9
decision taken was not such that it would assure future inflation would be within the target, all
else being equal. For instance a correct inflation forecast would signal a need to increase
interest rates but the bank would instead choose to decrease them. The second reason may be
that the forecast was wrong.
11 For instance the reason why the forecast signalled a need to
raise interest rates was that fiscal loosening was expected but did not materialise in the end. In
such a situation, an initially correct policy tightening could lead to undershooting the target.
The third reason for missing the target may be that the bank intentionally chose not to fulfil
the target. This is related to the reaction of monetary policy to supply shocks discussed in the
previous chapter and possibly to the “escape clauses” to fulfilling the target. The fourth
reason may be that the central bank could not fulfil the target given its tools. For instance a
very strong negative demand shock could require that interest rates go below zero or the
shock could come at a time when even the most aggressive reaction would not be sufficient to
return inflation back to the target within the given horizon. This discussion shows that
understanding why the targets were not met is not trivial. In fact, in practice the reason why a
target was missed may be a combination of the above-mentioned reasons among which it is
sometimes impossible to distinguish.
In the Czech case, the comparison between the actual inflation rates for the net and
headline inflation rates and the corresponding inflation targets is depicted in Figure 2. The
figure shows that the net inflation rate was lower than the given year-end net inflation target
three times and inside the target once. As for the target corridor, inflation stayed inside the
corridor for four months at the beginning of 2002 and then went below the target.
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Since decisions are taken monthly and the CNB’s forecasts were also produced monthly
for most of the period, it is beyond the scope of this article to analyse every decision within
the “four-reason framework” introduced above. Such an analysis is partially conducted in the
                                                
11 This reason could be further broken down into two “sub-reasons” connected to creating a forecast: either the
exogenous assumptions of a given forecast could be wrong or the transmission mechanism could not be captured
correctly.10
CNB’s Inflation Reports.
12 For this reason, we will limit ourselves only to providing several
factors that had – according to the CNB’s Inflation Reports – a major influence on
undershooting the targets in the given year.
In the first two years of IT (1998 and 1999) there was an extraordinary concurrency of
negative supply and demand shocks. On the demand side, the correction of the previous
excessive growth achieved by the tightening of both fiscal and monetary policies led to a
slowdown of economic growth and later to a recession. The development on the world food
market and the remarkable fall of oil prices together with exchange rate appreciation,
however, inserted a much stronger downward pressure on inflation than the opening negative
output gap. In 1999 the same factors continued to affect price development, most notably
falling food prices and the negative output gap that did not allow the propagation of rising oil
prices into domestic inflation. In 2000, most of these extreme developments started to fade
away, the economy was growing (albeit still below its potential) and inflation started to rise
back towards the target. This year is also connected to the so-called “opportunistic
disinflation” – a term often used in the literature (see e.g. Orphanides and Wilcox, 1996) to
mark one of the reasons for missing, specifically undershooting, the target that was referred to
above. Namely, in the end of 1999 the CNB announced that it would use the disinflation
process from the preceding years to stabilise inflation at the attained low levels (see CNB,
1999b). In 2001, inflation stayed low and the inflation target was met for the first time. The
introduction of the inflation target corridor in 2002 saw inflation within the target only for a
few months. In mid-2002 inflation dipped below the target where it stayed until the second
half of 2003. The main reason for this development was a strong exchange rate appreciation, a
protracted slowdown of the world economy and another period of decreasing food prices. A
prominent reason for undershooting the target in 2002 and 2003 has also been a much lower
(and again pro-cyclical) contribution of regulated prices to inflation than the 1 - 1.5 p.p.
envisaged while setting the inflation target.
Macroeconomic stability and expectations
Another approach to examining the performance of monetary policy is to ask how
stabilising it has been for the decision-making of economic agents. Since forward-looking
agents base their decisions today on the expected future state of the economy, stable
expectations mean monetary policy is believed to assure stable future economic development.
In general, expectations have a prominent role in monetary policy-making and this is
particularly true in Inflation Targeting. First, they have a direct effect on future developments.
Second, and more importantly in this context, they are a certain measure of macroeconomic
stability. In this section we examine inflation and interest rate expectations.
As for the inflation expectations, since there is not a liquid market with indexed bonds in
the Czech Republic, survey methods are used. The CNB started to survey financial market
analysts on a monthly basis in May 1999 and since September 1999 it has also been surveying
inflation expectations of households and enterprises on a quarterly basis. Figure 3 plots the
one-year ahead inflation expectations together with the development of inflation.
13 It is clear
from the figure, even without a formal analysis, that inflation expectations are more stable
than the actual inflation rate. The fall in inflation in 1999 or 2002 was understood as only
                                                
12 In particular, every January issue of the Inflation Report examines in detail the fulfilment of the inflation target
in the previous year. Since 2002 such an analysis is conducted quarterly which reflects the change from the year-
end targets to a system with a continuous target corridor.
13 Until 2002, expectations of households and enterprises were also surveyed for end of the year – following the
practice of year-end inflation targets. Since 2003 this question in the survey questionaire has been replaced by a
three-year ahead measure in compliance with the financial markets survey.11
temporary, as was the one-off rise in July 2001.
14 In general the figure shows that financial
market participants are more resistant to actual inflation developments. This could mean that
they are less backward-looking in their expectation formation process than the enterprises or
households.







































































































































Apart from the one-year ahead expectations, the financial markets participants are also
asked what inflation they expect in a three-year-ahead horizon. Because of lags in the
transmission mechanism, the three-years-ahead inflation expectations are suitable for
evaluating if inflation targets are credible and well communicated. If the regime is credible,
inflation expectations will be near the targets. Figure 4 depicts the difference between the
three-years-ahead expectations and the corresponding medium-term inflation target in
percentage points. Examining the results, one can observe only a very gradual rise in the
credibility of the three-year-ahead target. The announcement of the inflation target corridor
for headline inflation in April 2001, discussed in the previous chapter, is connected with a
subsequent stabilisation of long-term expectations close to the target level with a variance of
+/- 0.5 p.p. These findings are in line with the conclusion of Neumann and von Hagen (2002)
that IT has a stabilising impact on inflation expectations. Analysing the numbers in greater
detail we also examined the behaviour of long-term inflation expectations in two
homogeneous groups: domestic and foreign analysts. The behaviour of the two groups has
been roughly similar since mid-2000. Prior to that, one can observe that foreign analysts
expected the medium-term target would be undershot while the opposite can be said about the
expectations of domestic analysts.
                                                
14 The relative stability of inflation expectations would be even clearer if the household’s inflation expectations
were excluded. The reason they map the actual inflation the most is that the households had been surveyed in the
past by first being offered the actual inflation figure and then asked what they expected in 12 months. This
practice, which might have led to a more backward-looking behaviour, was abandoned in late 2002.12
Figure 4: Deviation of three-years-ahead inflation expectations of financial


































































































































inflation expectations of domestic analysts
inflation expectations of foreign analysts
Under the expectations heading we next examine the expectations of policy moves by the
CNB. Monetary policy is transparent and predictable if the central bank’s decisions are
generally expected by economic agents. To test for transparency of the CNB’s monetary
policy, we examine to what extent the policy moves of the CNB have been anticipated. The
logic behind our exercise is as follows. If economic agents understand the central bank’s
policy decision pattern, changes in the monetary policy interest rate will be widely expected
and already priced into the market before the actual change in the money market interest rate
takes place. If the market rate changes after a Bank Board meeting, this means that the
decision was different from what economic agents had expected and this decision had not
been fully priced in the market rate. We use a very simple indicator of the predictability of
monetary policy suggested by Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002). The approach rests in
examining the differences between the one-month money market interest rate (1MPRIBOR)
the day after the Bank Board’s meeting and the day before it. We choose the one-month rate
since shorter rates are under strong influence of the daily repo operations of the central bank
and are thus not a sensible measure of market expectations. The differences approximate the
ratio of “surprise” of the agents. For example, if the value of the “surprise” is –0.25 p.p., this
means that economic agents expected a higher monetary policy rate by 0.25 p.p.13











































































































































































































The results are depicted in Figure 5. They point to a systematic bias in expectations;
specifically, economic agents have systematically expected higher monetary policy interest
rates than they turned out to be in reality. One could speculate that this bias is a consequence
of more backward-looking expectations of financial market participants than of the CNB.
Specifically, if the CNB is more foreward-looking than the rest of the agents in the economy
(which is often assumed in macroeconomic models), then in disinflations it will loosen its
policy stance faster than generally expected. Nevertheless, the “surprises” have been declining
since the beginning of the Inflation Targeting period, which suggests a gradual improvement
in the transparency of CNB’s monetary policy decision-making.
15  Recently the trend is not so
clear as several policy decisions during 2002 were either not anticipated (April 2002) or the
change of the interest rates was expected to be smaller (July 2002).
To summarise this section, it seems that the expectations of economic agents on future
inflation in both the one-year and three-year-ahead horizons are remarkably stable which
suggests a belief in the stabilising properties of monetary policy. The long-term inflation
targets seem credible but the decisions leading to fulfilling the targets are not well expected in
advance which suggests there is still some scope to enhance the predictability, transparency
and communication of the CNB.
16
                                                
15 One of the referees suggested this improvement in predictability could be connected to the fact that the
frequency of interest rate changes went down and the rates even stayed stable in 2000. However, we interpret the
decision not-to-change rates just as important as changing rates. The effect on expectations may be very similar
– see December 2002 when market expected a rate cut but the rates stayed stable. The relative stability of our
indicator in 2000-2001 could rather be connected to lower occurrence of shocks that monetary policy would like
to respond to. More detailed analysis would be needed to prove this.
16 The quality of CNB’s publications on monetary policy – an important element of transparency – was recently
noted in a comprehensive study by Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz (2003) that evaluates Inflation Reports of 20
IT central banks. The Bank of England’s report is considered the best while the CNB ranks sixth in the survey –
better than such experienced inflation targeters as Sweden, Australia and Canada.14
The loss function approach
Another way to evaluate the performance of monetary policy is through the “loss function
approach”. The loss function mathematically captures the preferences of agents that minimise
fluctuations – losses – of the relevant variables around their desired levels. These are
generally long run equilibrium values of the variables. General additive separable loss
function is (1) where value of losses (L) is given by the sum of weighted squared deviations
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It would be useful to inspect the social loss function while examining the impact of
monetary policy on the utility of economic agents. Since this is difficult to construct, we
instead suppose the agents in the economy delegate monetary policy and the connected
preferences to an independent central bank (CB) and we therefore inspect the CB’s loss
function. In the case of the CNB, the delegating was done through the Act on the CNB (No.
6/1993 Coll.). According to Article 2 of the Act, the primary aim of the CNB is price stability
and “if this primary aim is not threatened then the CNB should support the general economic
policies of the Government leading to sustainable economic growth”. Thus the Act explicitly
sets two of CB’s preferences: price stability and sustainable economic growth.
As was already mentioned, the price stability goal has been in effect only since May 2002;
up to May 2002 the main aim was monetary stability. However, we believe price stability
well approximates the main aim for the whole time period.
17 For this reason we will measure
price stability by squared deviations of inflation from the targeted inflation. In transition
countries the rate of inflation, considered to represent price stability, is higher than in the
developed countries due to distorted relative prices that imply a certain price adjustment
process. These distortions are partly eliminated through spontaneous price movements and
partly through deregulations. These are, however, rather discrete events. They are manifested
through big jumps in the overall inflation rate. CB would not react to these deregulations’
induced jumps and therefore it is better not to take this into account during the analysis of the
performance of monetary policy. We remove these influences and use net inflation. We also
experimented with narrower price indices (core inflation and core inflation excluding oil
prices) but as the results did not differ significantly, we do not report them here.
There are basically two possibilities of setting the level of price stability in this exercise.
First, one can focus on the steady state and ask how high an inflation would correspond to the
steady state. In the CNB’s Monetary Strategy (CNB, 1999) the long run price stability is
defined as 2 % 1 p.p. for net inflation. Second, one can concentrate on the disinflation path
from high inflation to the steady-state inflation. This can be done in two ways. One is to work
with the announced inflation targets that describe the disinflation path chosen ex ante. This is
the approach we took in the first part of this chapter while comparing actual inflation with the
inflation targets. Another way to define the disinflation path is to take an explicitly ex post
approach in which the disinflation path leading to a series of “ex post targets” is a function of
equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation.
                                                
17 Monetary stability covers the internal part and the external part – price stability and exchange rate stability.
Although up to the end of May 1997 the CNB had pegged the exchange rate and afterwards changed the
exchange rate regime to floating, we assume the CNB did not change its preferences but only the way to achieve
them. The exchange rate peg was justified to import low foreign inflation, to decrease inflation expectations and
thus inflation to a desired low level. Therefore exchange rate stability is very firmly connected with price
stability.15
Specifically, we suppose an equilibrium process of real exchange rate appreciation (which
arises from the Balassa-Samuelson effect, adjustment of terms of trade and price
deregulations) may be realised through two channels: nominal exchange rate appreciation
and/or positive inflation differential. Up to May 1997 the exchange rate was pegged and
therefore the equilibrium exchange rate appreciation had to manifest itself only through
higher inflation. However, after abandoning the peg and switching to IT, the relative price
adjustments between tradables and non-tradables could also “leak” through nominal exchange
rate appreciation. Therefore we use the definition of real exchange rate appreciation (positive
values mean depreciation, 
CZ GER ER RER        ) to derive a series of “ex post (net)
inflation targets”. We estimate the path of the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation by a
Kalman filtering technique (average appreciation is around 5.3 %) and set the German
equilibrium inflation to 1.5 %, which is broadly in line with the actual developments and the
ECB’s target. Nominal exchange rate appreciation up to 1997Q2 reflects the fixed exchange
rate regime and is set to zero. After this period we take the actual nominal appreciation and
use a Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract a trend. We assume that the long-term trend in the
nominal exchange appreciation is a good approximation for implicit equilibrium nominal
exchange rate appreciation. This assumption is the main drawback of this approach, because it
assumes that the trend in the nominal exchange rate appreciation is exogenous (from the view
of setting the inflation target). After this initial step, we subtract the gradually decreasing
contribution of regulated prices (from 3 p.p. to 1 p.p.) to obtain the “ex post targets” for net
inflation. These gradually decrease from 4.5 % in 1995 to the 2 % steady state in late 2001.
Figure 6 compares these two definitions of the inflation target used in the loss function
analysis below.
18














































































































The second aim of the central bank – sustainable economic growth – is often defined in
terms of stable growth. The reason is that fluctuations of GDP lead to a worse allocation of
resources, which leads to a smaller attainable level of GDP. In other words, this goal is
approximated by a zero output gap in the CB’s loss function as a policy goal.
                                                
18 Note that these artificial “ex post targets” reflect the actual nominal exchange rate appreciation. This is the
main reason they are about 2 p.p. smaller than the CNB’s actual targets for net inflation (see Table 1). Further,
note that the articifial target path decreses over time, just like the actual target path. Since current estimates show
that the rate of real exchange rate appreciation decreased only very gradually, this means that the rate of nominal
exchange rate appreciation was to rise in order to meet both the actual and, of course, these articifial targets.16
Now we can derive a specification of the loss function (2). The important task is to set
weights to mirror the supposed preferences for stable prices vis-a-vis stable growth. Because
of lack of data we cannot estimate weights in the loss function directly. Instead, we use the
estimates by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) who specified the average weight on the inflation
gap to 0.75 for IT countries. Therefore we set the weight   (weight on the inflation gap) to
0.75 as a baseline in equation (2). This implies a 0.25 (1-0.75) weight on output gap, and the
inflation gap-output gap ratio is 3:1. Because of uncertainty we test another two calibrations,
in which we let   equal 0.5 (same weights on inflation and output) and 1.0 (strict inflation
targeting).
2 * 2 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t t
T
t t t y y L            (2)
Further, we test for the inclusion of the exchange rate in the loss function. First, this could
follow from the CB’s pursuit of low exchange rate volatility in order to minimise the
possibility of an exchange rate crisis and bubbles. Second, the important role of the exchange
rate in the policy decision making of the CNB is suggested by Cervenka and Navratil
(2003).
19 Moreover, the concerns about exchange rate volatility are also clearly detectable
from reading the Minutes of the Board meetings of the CNB. We therefore test the robustness
of our results by including the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate in the loss
functions through specification (3), in which we set the weights of   to 0.6 and of  to 0.2.
We also present two other calibrations:   to 0.4 and 0.8,    to 0.3 and 0.1 for sensitivity
analysis.
2 2 * 2 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( t t t
T
t t t er y y L                  (3)
Next we proceed with calculating the loss functions using quarterly data for 1995Q1 –
2002Q4. We examine four specifications - two with a constant inflation target and two with a
decreasing inflation target (see Figure 6). Under both types of targets we test for including the
exchange rate in the loss function. The results are normalised so that the highest value of
baseline case is equal to one and are depicted in Figures 7 to 10 below. The general outcome
is that after introduction of the IT regime in the Czech Republic the average losses have
gradually decreased to a lower level compared to the pre-inflation targeting period. In 1998
and 1999 there was an increase in the values. This was connected with exogenous shocks,
which were under the institute of escape clauses, and partly because with the opportunistic
disinflation described in the first part of this chapter. However, after these shocks the losses
decreased to a relatively lower levels. The average values of losses in the inflation targeting
period in comparison to the pre-inflation targeting period are smaller by 75 % in the case of
the “constant target” specifications and by 35 % in the “decreasing target” specifications. The
differences are relatively large but the result that inflation targeting is connected with lower
losses seems quite robust.
                                                
19 Sutherland (2001) or Batini et al. (2001) offer a discussion of the exchange rate treatment within a central
bank’s loss function.17
Figure 7: Losses with inflation gap (constant
target) and output gap
Figure 8: Losses with inflation gap (decreasing























































































































































































































Figure 9: Losses with inflation gap (constant
target), output gap and exchange rate
Figure 10: Losses with inflation gap (decreasing
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3  Summary and a Look Ahead
The Czech National Bank introduced Inflation Targeting as a tool to stabilise the
economy in late 1997. It was directed at short-term stabilisation after the exchange rate
turmoil in 1997 but more importantly at stabilising the price level in the medium-term. The
rate of inflation fell from an average of 11.8 % in the period of combined monetary and fixed
exchange rate targeting (1993-1997) to 4.7 % during the Inflation Targeting period (1998-
2002). While external shocks played an important role, our analysis shows that the strategy
significantly contributed to maintaining stable inflation environment.
We show that the regime design evolved over time from a rather specific setting towards
a framework based on international best practices. The distinct features of the regime
introduced at the beginning of the regime – as were the short-term targets defined as a
December-to-December change in prices in terms of net inflation – were abandoned as the
framework evolved and were replaced with a more standard set-up. This, however, is not to
say that the specific features were a step in the wrong direction – they simply fulfilled their
role in the specific environment. Nevertheless, the move towards a smoothly declining target
corridor from the end-year targets made the Czech IT regime more transparent. At the same
time, the CNB abandoned the net inflation index and started to target the headline inflation.
This reflected the choice to manage the difficult issue of communicating reactions to supply
shocks through the so-called escape clauses rather than through a narrower inflation index.
The changes in the regime must, however, be analysed from the point of view of the final
objectives of monetary policy. It would be no good to have a regime with “best-practice”
design if the final aims of monetary policy were not attained. Evaluating the performance of
monetary policy is a challenging task. We offer three methods, explain why they could be
suitable and attempt an evaluation. First, we look at the crudest of the methods - a comparison
of inflation and the inflation targets. The inflation rate in the Czech Republic stayed below the
targeted rate of inflation for most of the period under discussion. We ask what the causes
were and develop a framework that distinguishes among four possible reasons for missing the18
target. We argue that external disinflation played a crucial role in the past development of
inflation. Second, it is argued that since the goal of monetary policy in the end is to facilitate
efficient decisions of economic agents, one could attempt to evaluate monetary policy by
examining whether it has led to a more stable decision-making environment. In this context
we analyse the developments of inflation expectations and policy moves expectations. We
show that inflation expectations have been remarkably stable and resistant to one-time swings
in the inflation rate. The long-term inflation expectations moved closer to the long-term target
over time, which is interpreted as a gradual increase in the credibility of the CNB’s monetary
policy targets. To further scrutinise the stabilising impact of monetary policy on the decision-
making of economic agents, we examine to what extent the policy moves of the CNB have
been anticipated in advance. The more policy changes are anticipated, the more transparent
the policy is. We conclude that after the initial period, the CNB’s interest rate moves became
more anticipated. This positive process, however, seems to have been partially disrupted
during 2002. Finally, the last approach we suggest for evaluating the performance of
monetary policy is the standard exercise of the impact of monetary policy on the variability of
prices, inflation and the output gap. We offer an approach in which the variability of inflation
and the output gap are examined in the same time and label the approach as a “loss function
approach”. Under this approach, it is essential how one defines the mean value of inflation.
We offer two solutions - one of stable inflation at the level of price stability and the other with
a decreasing inflation mean. Using this approach, we conclude that the period of Inflation
Targeting is connected with a smaller value of overall losses and further argue that the losses
themselves decreased during the Inflation Targeting period.
Overall, it seems that the Inflation Targeting regime has contributed to higher
macroeconomic stability of the Czech economy. In the future the CNB could consider having
its regime and internal procedures evaluated by an external body or economist as the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand (Svensson, 2001), the Bank of England (Pagan, 2002) or the Norges
Bank (Svensson et al., 2002) have done. The outlook to the future of Czech monetary policy
is no doubt connected with the integration of the Czech Republic into the EU and later the
EMU. Joining the EU in 2004 will most likely not have any significant impact on the way
Czech monetary policy is conducted as the euro will be adopted only after the CR becomes
part of the Eurosystem. The exchange rate policy in the EU will become a matter of “common
concern” in the ESCB but this should not critically influence the way the CNB conducts its
managed floating regime under Inflation Targeting. The current inflation target is defined
until the end of 2005 and preparations and background studies are now under way for setting
the new inflation target. The target may be decreasing or it may be constant, it may be defined
as a point target or follow past practice as an interval target. Whatever the final choice, the
target for 2006 and beyond should be announced no later than in April 2004.
The biggest challenge for Czech monetary policy in the future will be, however,
connected with the hand-over of its sovereignty to the ECB. The CNB released its “euro
strategy” in December 2002 to start up a general discussion with the public and the
government (see CNB, 2002). In the meantime, Inflation Targeting is viewed as a useful
strategy to stabilise the economy and the compulsory participation in the ERMII is regarded
merely as the gateway into the eurozone. In the future, the CNB should be ready to contribute
to the common monetary policy of the eurozone with its experience in the field of Inflation
Targeting.19
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